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The proceedings of the Weizenbaum Conference 2021 "Democracy in Flux: Order, Dynamics and 
Voices in Digital Public Spheres" have been funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Re-
search of Germany (BMBF) (grant no.: 16DII121, 16DII122, 16DII123, 16DII124, 16DII125, 
16DII126, 16DII127, 16DII128 – "Deutsches Internet-Institut"). 
Today, uncivil verbal behavior is generally perceived as a threat to democratic quality of public dis-
course (Vollhardt et al., 2007; Miller & Vaccari, 2020), including integrity and rationality of online 
discussions (Badjatiya et al., 2017). Some research shows that these effects are moderate. Thus, harsh 
commenting can trigger an increase in readers’ hostile cognitive reactions but does not help incivility 
grow in the recipients’ commenting behavior (Rösner, Winter & Krämer, 2016), even if the ac-
ceptance of flaming as decent behavior and intention to flame is higher for verbally aggressive 
YouTube users (Cicchirillo, Hmielowski & Hutchens, 2015). But the claim that aggressive content 
is, in general, destructive for online discussions is not contested.  
Several rare works, though, have dragged attention to controversial relations between free expression 
and hate speech (Dorsett, 1996; Cammaerts, 2009), as well as to specific functions of aggressive 
content, for community building and cultural delineation/(de)alignment. Thus, possible use of uncivil 
language in positive sense was discussed for communication of discriminated communities like 
LGBTQ (Davidson et al., 2017) or African Americans, especially in the rap lyrics (Spears, 1998; 
Schneider, 2010). Also, it has been shown that harsh language ‘is not solely a product of an individual 
speech habit but also a spreadable social practice’ (Kwon & Gruzd, 2017, p 1). 
In various periods of the Russian political history, certain types of uncivil language (like obscene 
speech) have gained political relevance, if not prominence. It has not only been a sign of political 
transformation (see the classic work of Seliscev (1928)) but also a rhetorical tool, including for the 
politicians in Russia and Ukraine in the 2000s (Gasparov, 2006). Today’s detabooization of obscene 
lexicon (‘mat’) and widening the boundaries of mat-based communicative behavior in the Russian 
everyday discourse, as well as in media, political speeches, and youth communication, is seen as a 
reaction to over-officialized Soviet public rhetoric (Ablamskaya, 2011). The use of ‘unofficial’ lan-
guage is seen as a form of social protest, emotional détente, and assignment of phrasal emphasis; as 
well, mat words are used as connective particles to condense speech. Over 60% of people who de-
taboo harsh talk are 14 to 30 years old (Ablamskaya, 2011). Another part of harsh speech – that is, 
radical and extremist one – has also been widespread on Runet, the Russian-speaking segment of the 
internet (Salimovsky & Ermakova 2011). These processes of detabooization and radicalization of 
discourses change the status of uncivil speech itself: in opinion of several scholars, it no longer 
strongly marks particular social groups and is used more situationally, as a tool for inter-group adap-
tation.  
Given this, aggressive speech may gain new roles online, including the abovementioned spurring of 
flaming, marking new user groupings or influencers, or facilitating inter-group user ‘migration’. Nor-
matively, these roles may be also positive, not just negative. This might be especially true for restric-
tive political and legal environments like Russia of today where obscene lexicon is prohibited by law 
in registered media and the political environment does not give much space for voicing discontent. 
As Russian Youtube has since the 2000s become an ‘alternative television’ (Litvinenko, 2021) polit-
ically polarized (Ushkin, 2014) and dominated by voices of liberal opposition (Etling et al., 2010) but 
also containing pro-state voices who often imitate user-generated content, we have chosen it for our 
investigation.  
Building upon the concept of communicative aggression (Sidorov, 2018) and today’s works on multi-
class detection of toxic speech (Badjatiya et al., 2017; Park & Fung, 2017), we explore the roles of 
two under-researched types of communicative aggression—obscene speech and politically motivated 
hate speech—within the publics of video commenters. We do so by addressing the following research 
questions: (RQ1) Does communicative aggression affect discussion dynamics? (RQ2) What roles do 
various types of communicative aggression play in political discussions online?  
Taking Russian YouTube as an example, we use the case of the Moscow protests of 2019 against 
non-admission of independent and oppositional candidates to run for the Moscow city parliament. 
The sample of over 77,000 comments for 13 videos of more than 100,000 views has undergone pre-
processing and vocabulary-based detection of communicative aggression. To assess the impact of 
uncivil speech upon the dynamics of the discussions, we have used Granger tests and assessment of 
discussion histograms; we have also assessed the selected groups of posts in an exploratory manner. 
Our findings demonstrate that communicative aggression fuels discussion under commentaries by 
political activists, while under commentaries by foreign news media both effects appear in weak to 
medium state, and, under news pieces, the effects are clearly much less sound. In smaller discussions, 
obscene language might be provocative and bring on politically harsh speech, while, in bigger dis-
cussions, this effect is overcome.  
Anti-state hate speech is certainly destructive to potential consensus between political antagonists, 
however is might become a constructive means of counter-public consolidation. Among other things, 
communicative aggression helps to express immediate support and solidarity. In the Russian case, 
communicative aggression is linked to giving voice to political opposition, which is overwise ex-
cluded from the mainstream discourse, and may foster counter-publics and offline action. This func-
tion of aggressive speech is in line with the strand of research on agonistic public spheres that em-
phasizes the importance of political conflict and political voices ‘from the margins’ for public delib-
eration (Dahlberg, 2007, p. 128). If, as in Russia, obscene language is officially banned in the media, 
using this kind of uncivil language per se might become a way to challenge the hegemonic official 
discourses.  
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